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Abstract
The intemational climate regime 、 primarily designed to lim Ít the emissions of po Jl utants
causing global wamling, has failed. Why has intemational cooperation to combat global
wamling been so difficult , and what factors must change to improve the situation-assuming
it is even possible? Using Mancur Olson's classical theory of collective action , this essay
endeavors to explain the failure of the climate regime. Other intemational environmental
agreements and the associated regimes, such as the Mediterranean Action Plan and the
Montrea\ Protocol on ozone depletion 、 demonstrate that collective action to address
inte ll1 ational environmental problems is possible. Both agreements contain the ingredients
that c1 assical theory suggests are necessary to achieve collective action. But the f1 ipside of
collective action theory-that collective action in larger groups is 叮叮 difficult or
unlikely--c an also apply to intemational agreements and action on climate change. Despite
the Mediterranean and Montreal successes, relatively speaking, and in spite of 50 much effort
over two decades to create an effective climate regim巳 it is by no means apparent that the
elements for success will exist for the foreseeable future . We should expect a continued
muddling along that may , at best 、 reduce slightly-but not reverse-global wanning at some
point in the relatively distant 仇lture . Climate change is with us to stay

Facing Reality: Pernicious Obstacles to Collective Action on Climate Change

lt is now patently clear that the world is facing a growing set of environmental dangers. The
greatest among them is probably cJ ill1 ate

change一一changes

to Earth's climate systell1,

manifested in events such as drought , f1 oods , sea-level rise , major temperature rises in some
regions (e.g. , the Artic) and potentially precipitous faJJs in others (e.g. , Europe) , extinction of
species and spread of pests (to give but a sa ll1 pling of the myriad adverse impacts of climate
change ).1 Climate change arises from global wam1Î ng , which is caused by humankind's
polllltion ofthe atmosphere with greenhollse gases (GHGs) , notably carbon dioxide coming
from the bllrning of fossil fue1s.

2

This human-induced global wanning was , until recently,

viewed as a.fulure prob1em. But we are now coming to realize that ongoing climatic changes
3

are very probably consequences of globa1 warming. The internationa11egal instruments
intended to avert dangerous interference with the Earth's climate-the stated aim of the
Framework Convention on C1imate Change

(FCC C)一is

increasingly about mitigating that

dangerolls interference and plltting in place mechanisms for adapting to it
International cooperation is required to address climate change because it is caused by
poJJution originating in countless locations in every country of the WOl吋， and its
consequences will be so ha1111ful that on1y with internàtional assistance wiU the weakest and
poorest peoples and states be able to adapt to future environmental conditions. Climate
change is a coJJective action proble ll1. As Duncan Snide1 points out , "The problem of
inte l11 ationa1 cooperation is essentially one of collective action applied to the pm1icular
circumstances of the international system. ,, 4 Although there are many constraints that tend to
limit collective action , especiaJJy among disparate states , there have been a few instances in
which intemational enviro l1 mental cooperatio l1 has been relative1y successfu l. Among these
ll1 stances

are the Mediterranean Action Plan (Med Plan) for reducing poJJution ofthe

Mediterranean Sea and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
a l1 agreement for limiting damage to the earth's protective layer of stratospheric ozone
Climate change has required , and will continue to require , similar international cooperation ,
but on a

verγmuch

greater scale.

About two decades ago , governments came to recognize the need for just such
coopel刮 ion ，

and in 1992 most of them signed the FCC C. Tl1e core objective of the FCCC is

"stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be
achieved within a time-frame sufficient to aIIow ecosystems to adapt naturally to c1 imate
change 、 to

ensllre that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development

to proceed in a sustainable manner. 川 Diplomats subsequently negotiated the Kyoto Protocol
to the FCCC , which requires developed country parties to reduce their emissions of GHGs by
abollt 5 percent below 1990 levels by 2012 . However, not all developed countries are pm1ies
to the Kyoto agreemen t. Most notably, the United States (US) , the source of about
one-qu a11er of the pollutants causing global wam1Ï ng , has refused to rati 方 the agreement
(although the Clinton administration signed the treaty in 1992) , and over the last half decade
under President George W. Bush it has sought to undennine it at eve可 tum
Scientists te lJ us that emissions of carbon dioxide and other GHGs must be cut by at
Jeast 60 percent just to stabilize thcir concentrations in the atmosphere and to prevent chaos

川 the global cJimate system .(, Yet、 even with fu Il implementation as negotiated among the
pal11 郎、 the Kyoto Protocol will resuJt in reductions of well under 5 percent of parties'

e 11l 1ssions because the manner in which parties are allowed to meet their commitments (e .g. ,
em1ss lO 11S tl叫 ing and land-use changes ["carbon sinks"]) will not in fact result in significant
national emissions cuts. The Kyoto Protocol is , at best , a small (but potentially very
llnportant) baby step toward greater action. 1n the meantime , global GHG emissions will
2

continue to rise precipitously, notably because large developing countries (especially China
and lndia) , along with the US , wi l1 be increasing their use of fossil fuels as their economies
grow. Climate change will continuc , virtua l1 y unabated , short of new, l11 uch 1110re aggressive
collective action to reduce GHGs. However, strong signals of the more robust action needed
are distinct in their absence. The best that we can expect at present is a muddling along that
wi l1, at best , slightly reduce global wanning at some point in the relatively distant future.
Despite the Kyoto Protocol entering into force in February 2005 、 the climate regime has been
a failure.
What explains this failure? Why has intemational cooperation to combat global warming
been so difficult , and what factors must change to improve the situation一吋r is significant
improvement even likcly? Using Mancur Olson's theory of co l1 ective action (CAT) ,7 this
arti c\ e endeavors to explain the failure of the climate regime to stabilize , let along
significantly cut , emissions ofGHG po l1 utants. The Med Plan and the Montreal Protocol
demonstrate that classical CAT is applicable to international environmental problems. Both
agreements contain some of the ingredients that Olson says are necessary to achieve
collective action. But the f1 ipside ofthe theory-that collective action in large groups is
unlikely-also applies to intemational environmental cooperation. Despite the Mediterranean
and Montreal successes (at least compared to climate change) , it is by no means apparent that
the elements for success will exist for climate change in the

foreseeable 臼仙 re

Other theories could be brought to bear, and indeed have been , to show the complex,
multi-Ievel factors shaping cooperation on transnational environmcntal issues , including
c1 imate change.~ But even basic attributes of cooperation highlighted by CAT are lacking in

the climate regime , while the obsta c\ es highlighted by the theory are manifes t. Classical CAT,
despite its limits , was enough to predict the failure of c\ imate regime even in its earliest days ,
and it points to some issues that need to be addressed as more complex frameworks are used

to find ways of provoking the much greater cooperation that is required in the future . One
pnmarγaim of this article , then , is to show that the

c1 imate regime faces some of the most

fundamental obstacles to cooperation. This is not to say that all ofthe research on
intemational enVirOIUuental cooperation (in c1 uding my own , 1 hope

9

)

that has gone well

beyond classical CAT has been for naugh t. To the contrary, many of the answers to this
collective action problem are indeed found in domestic politics , multiple levels of analysis
and so forth . But the focus ofthese newer approaches are a bitlike explaining the integrity of
a building by focusing on its occupants and furnishings , or at perhaps its internal wa l1 s and
the personalities of neighbors , while ignoring that it lacks a proper foundation and is built on
loose ground. Classical CAT is no longer cachet among students of global environmental
politics , to be sure ‘ but it is still quite helpful in explaining why international cooperation and
development of robust intemational law on c1 imate change-or, more

precise句，

international

action to do something about it-remains extremely difficul t. lt helps bring us back to basics.
The remainder of this arti cI e consists of five sections. The first section describes a
number offeatures ofOlson's CAT. The second and third sections look at the Med Plan and
the Montreal Protocol , with emphasis

011

some of the factors that contributed to relatively

successful collective action in those areas. The fourth section examines the issue of climate
change and references CAT to explain the lack of a more robust intemational regime to
prevent it. 1 then CO l11l11 ent on the prospects for the cI il11 ate regime. Some of the "early"
literature

011

cli l11 ate change cooperation fro111 the late 1980s and early 1990s is cited here to

show that it was prescient in anticipating the difficulties of collective action , demonstrating
that we could

faÌI句 predict

the likelihood (or not) of collective action in this issue area ,

despite all of the complicated theoretical work done in recent years

4

Collective Action Thcory
On the final page ofthe oft-cited 刃惚。'Y oflnlernational Politics , Kenneth Waltz reaffinns
the imp 0l1anCe of collective action: "collective efforts are needed if common problems are to
be solved or somehow managed."IO He acknowledges that "global problems can be solved by
110 nation singly, only by a number of nations working together，川 I and he reaffirrns the need
to gamer an understanding of collective action and the extent to which it is possible in
relations among states. The notion of the collective action problem is not a new one.
Rousseau describes it in his Second Discourse when he writes of "the rare occasions when
common interest should make [a man] count on the assistance ofhis fellow men. . . .,, 12 Jn
his well-known story of the stag hunt , Rousseau tells us that men could acquire the

idea of l11 utual engagements and of the advantages of fulfilling them , but only
insofar as present and perceptible interest could require; for foresight meant
nothing to them , and far fr0111 being concemed about a distant

fu仙悶，

they did not

even think ofthe next day. Was it a matter of catching a deer, everγone clearly felt
that for this

pu中 ose

he ought faithfully to keep his post; but if a hare happened to

pass within reach of one of them , there can be no doubt that he pursued it without
scruple , and that havi月 obtained his prey, he cared veηlittle about having caused
his c0111panions to miss theirs.

13

Thus Rousseau introduces us to the difficulty ofundertaking collective action

,

ln the introduction to his seminal work，刃:Ie Logic ofCollective Action Mancur Olson
points to a c0 I11 111only held belief: assuming that they are rational , self-interested actors ,
everγone

interes t.

14

in a group with a common interest will act collectively to achieve that com lTI on

But，的 Olson shows , this is actually not the case ; empirical evidence does not
5

support this apparently logicai view of collective action.

15

Absent incentives separate from

the good being sought , rational actors will not necessarily act collectively to achieve a
common good that they all have an interest in obtaining. This is true even if the actors
involved have reached a consensus on what the good is and how best to achieve it (a
condition that is , astonishingly, still absent from the climate change question , at least in the
US where there are stiU influential cJ imate skeptics-President George W. Bush apparently
among them-who discount the problem while finding it increasingly difficult to deny its
importance). As Olson argues , "unless the number ofindividuals in a group is quite small , or
unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common
interest, ralional se!f- inlereSled individuals willnot acllo

achieν'e

fheir common 0 ,. group

1111eresls. ,,.. 16
To explain this phenomenon, it is useful to highlight some of the underlying logic and
principles associated with Olson's theory. A "common" or "collective" good is
available to

everγindividual ，

one 出 at

is

regardless ofwhether or not he or she pays for it. Collective

goods have two characteristics: "if they are available to one

countrγthey

are available to all

countries (access cannot be restricted), and one country's use ofthe good does not reduce its
availability to others. ,, 17 Collective goods are those that are characterized by "jointness" of
supply and the impossibility of exclusion.

1
K

Here we are interested in the protection of

collective goods-a stable cJimate system-from collective "bads ," namely atmospheric
pollution and its consequences. As Hardin indicates , "co l\ ective action problems , especially
those that are political issues, have as their best outcomes the elimination of hann rather than
the provision of good or goods." 19
E ven if there is a common interest in a collective good being sought by a group , there is
seldom a common interest in paying for that good. Each member o[ the group wants other
members to pay the costs of providing it because , by definition , each member will benefit
6

fro l11 the good regardless of whether or not he pays for it. As Waltz characterizes it ,"all have
reason to hang back , hoping that others wiU bear the costs-something that nobody may have
an incentive to do. ,, 20 According to Oran Young , "rational egoists operating in the absence of
effective

11l 1es

or social conventions often fail to realize feasible joint gains and end Up with

outcomes that are suboptimal (sometimes dramatically so) for a11 concemed. ,, 21 As Hardin
suggests , " many of those who want their co l1 ective interests to be served may weigh their
own self-interests heavily , even too heavily to cooperate in serving their collective
interests.'

.22

Some scholars believe that cooperation is somewhat easier than Olson's CAT suggests.
For instance ‘ Robel1 Keohane has said that , although cooperation is rare in world politics , it is
possible even among rational , self-interested actors if they are concemed about their
23

reputations or if an intemational institution exists to facilitate cooperation."'J The question is
whether pressure can be brought to bear effectively and what those institutions 111u5t look like
to bring about cooperation.
Using Olson's definition , a "group" is understood to mean "a number of individuals with
a common interest. ,, 24 Here this definition is expanded to cover nation-states. In so doing , we
assume that states seek to use rational means to achieve their desired ends; they are rational ,
self-interested , more-or-less unitary actors with motivations similar to those of the individuals
in Olson's groups.25 Olson describes three types of groups:2屆(1)、rivileged" groups in
which each member is willing to pay for provision of the collective good; (2) 叮 ntennediate"
s111a11 groups in which no one member has an interest in bearing the costs of providing the
good 、 but

in which there is some possibility for cooperation because the members are unable

to recognize those who are "free riding"; and (3) "latent" large groups in which the collective
good will not be provided unless one member is willing to absorb the costs of doing so , short
of selective Încentives . Ol son describes a large group that has been energized by selective
7

incentives as a "mobilized" latent group.
Some s111all groups can undertake collective action without coercion or positive
incentives. Ifone member (or subgroup ofmembers) ofthe group gets a large enough portion
of the benefits of providing the pllblic good to make paying for all or 1110St of it worthwhile ,
he or she will be willing to pay mllch (or all) ofthe costs ofaction.

27

Impo口ant旬， however,

the benefit going to the member(s) paying for the good must exceed the cost being paid by
the member(s) willing to bear the costs. But , as Olson suggests , the provision ofthe collective
good by these sma l1 groups will 110t be optimal , despite the fact that optimal provision would
be in the interests ofa 1ll11 embers ofthe groUp.28 Sub-optimal provision ofthe good results
because those members who do not pay for the collective good still benefit from it. This
phenomenon becollles more important as the group gets larger.
Three factors conspire to prevent large groups fro l11 undertaking collective action that
wOllld further the interests of the grollp 戶 First， the larger the group , the less benefit each
member receives and the further the group is frolll providing an optimal supply ofthe
collective good. Second, because of the small benefit each member of a large group receives ,
there is little likelihood that any one me l11 ber (or a few members) will pay the cost of
providing even SOllle of the good. Finally, larger groups are

1ll 0re

expensive to start and

operate , thereby creating an economic obstacle to collective action. The upshot is that , "In a
large , latent group there wi l1 be no tendency for the group to organize to achieve its goals
through the voluntary , rational action of the members of the group , even if there is perfect
consensus. Thus , according to Olson , in the absence of coercion or incentives beyond or
outside the good being sOllght , large groups 叭' ill not provide a collective good.
Olson tells us that the typical pal1icipant in a large grollp will be lI nwilling to devote
energies sllfficient to optima l1 y further the group's goals because each participant's
cO l1 tributio l1 will be relatively small and the resultant benefit to that individllal will be

exceeded by the cost of his efforts. lt is for this reason , "among others , that organizations so
often turn to the small group; committees , sub-committees , and smallleadership groups are

created、 and OllCe created they tend to play a crucial role. ,, 30 As Olson points out, '''action
taking' groups and subgroups tended to be much smaller than 'non-action taking' groups and
subgroups. [S]ma lJ groups could act more decisively and use their resources more effectively
than large groups. . . .,, 31 Com l11 ittees and working groups should be small to be effective
According to Olson , in order for the individuals in a large group to undertake the costs
of collective action there must be some S0I1 of sanction or incentive distinct from the good
being sough t: "Only a separate and selective incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a
latent group to act in a group oriented way.ρ2 As Keohane points out , the success of some
large groups can be explained by their having provided private goods as a by-product of
membership.33 The incentive-e ither positive or negative一must work selectively on
individuals in the group , not on the group as a whole. Groups can use negative
ag
伊
a
剖inst

those

i 吋 ividuals

not joini時

in

induce
白me
臼nt心
s

action , and give positive inducements or rewards to

those who do. A variety of incentives are possible to foster group participation and
cooperatlOl1只 Perhaps the most common category of incentives would be one that brings

economic benefit-o r difficulty-to the recipien t. Other moral , psychological or social
incentives could also prove useful in gamering support for collective action. For instance , the
prestíge 、 respect

and friendship associated with group membership may help induce an

individual to pm1icipate. Likewise , ostracism from the circle of individuals comprising the
group

l11 ay

help push a 110n-participant to join the group and contribute toward achievement

of the collcctive good
OI SOI1 suggests that social incentives will only work in small groups or large "federal"
groups (federations of s l11 aller groups). Olson does qualify this point by suggesting that mass
media propaganda may be a social incentive capable of 1110bilizing large groups: "lf the
9

members of a latent group are somehow continuously bombarded with propaganda about the
worthiness ofthe attempt to satisfy the common interest in question , they may perhaps in
time develop social pressures not entirely unlike those that can be generated in a face-to-face
group , and these social pressures may help the latent group to obtain the collective good.' ,35
As the story of the Montreal Protocol suggests (see below) , the media can be an important
stimulant fo 1' collective action. lnfonnation is also important to cooperation. According to
Hardin , "the degree of cooperation may depend on the quality of knowledge generally
available. ,, 36 Keohane argues that collective action is especially difficult when "uncertainty is
great and actors have different access to infonnation. . .

. ,, 37

Info l111ation proved to be a

critical factor in the creation ofthe Mediterranean cleanup and ozone-protection regimes
lnformation is proving to be even

I11 0re

critical for climate change

Arild Underdal has suggested a "law ofleast ambitious program ," which sU I11l11 arizes
ll1 uch

of Olson's logic: "where intemational management can be established only through

agreement among all significant parties involved , and where such a regulation is considered
only on its own merits, collective action will be limited to those measures acceptable to the
least enthusiastic pa口 y， [but that pa口y may join if there are adequate] argU I11 ents ,
side-payments , or various kinds of political pressure. ,, 38 The upshot is that parties will hold
back, even if they have strong interests in acting collectively. They have to be pushed rather
bard to join in if the costs of doing so are more than modest

Protecting the Mediterranean Sea
Amon 旦 successful

international enviromnental agreements are the Montreal Protocol and ,

albeit less so、 the Mediterranean Action Plan. The former is effective because collective
action has been sufficiently robust for scientists to predict that ozone depletion will be
reversed and reduced , with the

st!割的 pheric

ozone layer expected to recover over the next 50
10

years or SO.39 The latter has been

l1l 0destly

e tTective because it has resulted in a set of

cooperative arrangements , monitoring and regulation over a large and extraordinarily
正hsparate

group of states ‘ thereby limiting the impact of myriad pollution sources 011 the

Medite lT anean Sea. Both the Med Plan and the Montreal Protocol contain requisites for
collective action discussed by Olson , especially selective incentives or side-payments. These
international agree l11 ents can tell us a great deal about the efficacy of CAT in the
environmental

context、 and

how his

theOIγrelates

to the c\ imate regime.

Pollution of the MeditelTanean was perceived to be a collective goods problem because
pollutants from states bordering the sea were thought to be washing up on other states'
beaches叩 This perception contributed ultimately to creation of the Med Plan , a regime that

is "a collectively negotiated , ongoing set of arrangements for the progressive control of
Mediterranean marine pollution. ,, 41 Negotiated and agreed in the

l11 id-1970s ,

the Med Plan is

the product of the Barcelona CO l1 vention for the Protection of the Mediterranean against
Pol\ution. The plan brought together littoral states and the then European Community to
protect the sea's environment and , later, to pro l11 0te environmentally sustainable development
in the Meditemmean region. The plan now comprises a host of cooperative arrangements
among about two dozen governments and the European Union , working with the United
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and nongovernmental actors , in a "coordinating unit"
(secretariat) and regional activity centers戶
Not all analysts have described the Med Plan as successful given its apparently modest
impacts on polluting behaviors.
011

It 、 the

43

However, according to Peter Haas , who pioneered research

Med Plan has been

Ill oderately

successful because it induced member governments to take new policies that

enhanced environmental quality in the region , and that those govemments would not
1I

have adopted in the absence ofthe Med Plan. While the environmental data is choppy
and not very good , it does appear to be the case . . . that the Med is certainly no worse in
quality that in was before the Med Plan , and that the level of coastal population and
economic activity has doubled or tripled in the intervening years. Not to mention the
unintentional and unanticipated effects of establishing a political model for multilateral
cooperahon

44

Thus the Med Plan has done what the climate regime is supposed to have done:

“

abilize

pollution despite economic growth .
Several factors contributed to collective action to address Mediterranean pollution.
Contrary to some other scholars , Haas declares that "coercion , public opinion , and
anticipation ofbenefits do not fu l1 y explain the extent of compliance ," although these were
important contributing factors.

45

He suggests that the most significant factor leading to

co lI ective action and the Med Plan was the existence of "epistemic communities ," which he
describes as "ecologists and marine scientists who set the intemational agenda and directed
their own states toward

suppo 口 of intemational

efforts and toward the introduction of strong

po lI ution cOlltrol measures at home."的 According to Haas , the success of epistemic
communities in this instance can be largely attributed to their ability to increase
"govemmentalleaming," a process whereby scientists and ecologists informed domestic and
foreign policy makers about the extent of the problem so as to elicit their interest in
protecting the Mediterranean. The process Haas outlines is

complex 、 but

it is based

011

a

professional campaign to spread infonnation , and on the power that is frequently associated
with infonnatioll. As Olson suggested , infonnation eases the move to collective action.

47

An important additional factor contributing to the success of the Med Plan negotiations
included the involvement of an intemational organization , namely UNEP. UNEP provided
12

information and resources from its Regional Seas Program. UNEP also served as a
coordinator, enabling scientists and diplomats to pool their efforts toward the goal of a
c\ eaner

Medite叮anean.

Through its efforts UNEP helped the littoral states reduce transaction

costs and assisted them in opening additional diplomatic channels , thereby easing the move
toward co l\ ective action. 4R This function is analogous to Olson's smallleadership forums .
Haas's account

fu 口her

demonstrates the salience of Olson's basic CAT. Selective

incentives were used to promote cooperation. Monitoring and research provisions of the Med
Plan gave symbolic recognition to Mediterranean states' scientific stature. Research fllnds ,
technology and

scienti 日 c

eqllipment were transferred fro l11 the developed to the developing

participants in the plan. UNEP spread pollution-control construction contracts arollnd the
Mediterranean and hired consultants and distributed offices in such a way that the states most
resistant to joining the plan benefited from it.

49

Haas believes that epistemic communities and UNEP were sufficiently able to in f1 uence
states for them to "reca Jculate their interests in light of new infonnation , or as they are
penetrated by new groups. Thus , following such involvement , govemments were able to
overcome the domination of stronger states , and smaller states recognized the need to protect
the Mediterranean. ,, 50 The important components of the Med Plan's modest successeplstemic com l11 unities and UNEP-helped form a consensus and provided crucial
in[01111ation. These factors then led to the creation of a regime that had a variety of incentives
as part of its structure. Thus , the Med Plan shows the utility of key components ofCAT in the
context of intemational environmental cooperation. Having said that , the Med Plan has its
own weaknesses , not least its attempt to control so many pollutants over such a wide area
with too few resources , and the involvement of so many actors that coordination among them
is difficul t.

51

This is a waming to those who are negotiating the cJ imate regime that must

fo l1 ow the Kyoto Protocol commitment period (2008-2012)
13

Pr叭' enting

Stratospheric Ozone Depletion

The stratospheric ozone ìs a layer of gas surrounding the earth that filters dangerous
u \t raviolet radiation fr0111 the sun. Several chemicals emitted into the atmospherechlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other ozone-depleting chemicals (ODCs)-deplete thìs layer.
Among the adverse effects of this depletìon are increased levels of skin cancer and eye

cataracts、 crop damage and hann to the

l11 arìne

food chain , including fisheries.

S2

According

to Richard Benedick (then chìef US dìplomat ìn the ozone negotiations) , the Montreal
Protocol addresses "an unprecedented global ecological threat , one that required govem l11 ents
to balance distant but possibly catastrophic dangers against the

ve可 real

short-run economic

dislocations that would be caused by preventive measures."S3 These factors-potentially
catastrophic dangers and econo l11 ic dislocations-are also applicable to the climate regime.
Benedìck defined the dilem l11 a of protecting the COm1110n good of stratospheric ozone:
"The

VeIγnature

of ozone depletion meant that no single country or group of countries ,

however powerful , could effectively solve the problem. Without far-ranging cooperation , the
effolis of some natìons to protect the ozone layer would be vitiated. ,, 54 The obstacles facing
those wanting to develop an intemational regime to address ozone depletion were immense.
lndustrial interests, scientific uncertainties and technological hurdles were standing in the
way of collectìve action. Nevel1heless, an agreement to act collective\y was reached and
ultimately strengthened at subsequent meetings of parties to the protoco l.
Benedick attributed the success of the Montreal Protoco\ to several factors. Like Haas ,
he gives

l11 uch

credit to scientìsts (Haas's epistemic communities) who were active in

working groups set up to determine provisions of the treaty. According to Benedick's

account、

"Close collaboration between scìentists and key government officia\s who became convinced
of the long-term dangers ultimately prevaìled over 1110re parochial and short-run ìnterests of
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national politicians. ,, 55 lt was partly due to the influence of scientists that politicalleaders
took action on ozone despite there still being considerable uncertainty about the full nature of
the proble l11. Scientists , along with environmental nongovern l11 ental organizations , also
pl ayed a role in educating the public , thereby

l11 0bilizing

public opinion and prompting

l11 edia

attention. Additionally , leadership ofthe US govemment and (as with the Med Plan) UNEP
(and its head、 Mustafa Tolba) were "critical in 1110bilizing an international consensus.,, 5(i US
leadership was evident in its preemptive action to limit emissions of ODCs. This action
created al1 environ l11 ent in which industry had an economic incentive to find a technological
solution to the problem (namely, substitutes for ODCs , which US

industlγwas

first to

develop).
Another very important factor contributing to collective action on ozone were
side-payments offered to poorer countries that

l11 ight

not otherwise accede to the agreemen t.

The protocol calls for developed countries to "facilitate access" to financial assistance and the
technologies necessary to produce substitutes for ODCs. Among other incentives geared
toward convincing states to join the protocol , the European Coml11 unity was allowed to
aggregate its consumption limits to the benefit of individualmembers , the Soviet Union was
allowed to use CFC plants already under construction , small-scale producers of ODCs were
pemlitted to transfer production increases among themselves , and developing countries were
allowed to continue producing CFCs for a substantial additional period of time. 57 In addition
to such positive incentives , the treaty called for the gradual prohibition of purchases of ODCs
and products produced with or containing them . Such prohibitions imposed sanctions on
states outside the protocol that might exploit the end to production of ODCs by parties to i t.
Furthennore , a

ll1 ultilateral

ozone fund司 paid for by wealthy govemments , was created to

a ssist de veloping-country parties in switching to ODC alternatives.
The ozone regime demonstrates the importance of 0lson'5 sma1l working groups and
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cO J11 mittees. As Benedick repeatedly argues , it was the work of such groups that provided the
basis [or 50 111uch of the success at Montrea l. He points out that the "complicated ozone
protection issue was separated into manageable components , and infonl1 al collaborative
efforts-workshops , conferences , consultations一一laid the foundation for the eventual
intemational consensus. ,, 58 11l1 portantly, the Montreal ozone agreement was purposely made
flexible in order to re f1 ect

fu 山 re

changes in the scientific knowledge or the poIi tical

consensus; the agreement , "far from being a static solution . . . .constitutes an ongoÌng

process. ,, 59 lndeed, in subsequent

1l1 eetings

of the parties, restrictions 011 ODCs were

increased , as were specific fina l1 cial incentives and trade disincentives to bring new members
into the effort
The Montreal Protocol fulfills many of Olson's criteria for collective action. lncentiv白，
disincentives, infonl1 ation, leadership, small groups and iterated diplomatic engagement all
played their parts in fostering cooperation , and indeed extending and deepening it as the
problem became better understood. There are lessons here for the climate regime, although
ozone depletion is a vastly simpler problem to address than is global wanning

Protecting the C1 imate System
Most or possibly all countries will be affected by climate change, most (and probably all) of
them in adverse ways.('O Consequently, most ofthem have an interest in collective action that
will limit the emissions of GHGs polluting the Ealih's atmosphere , and concerted action is
required to address it. lt was clear to diplomats as they entered ne 皂otiations for the FCCC in
the late 1980s and early 1990s th3t dealing effectivcly with climate change would require the
creation of an intemational regime in which

1l1 0st

of the world's govemments would agree to

act collectively to reduce the emissions of GHGs. However, the number of countries making
major contributions to the problem is quite large and
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growing、 and

the costs of doing

something significant about it are high (at least to many economic sub-sectors). What is more ,
many govemments were not convinced that it would be in their immediate interests to pay
those costs , and
a

ha叫lf ago ,

ma叮 still

retain this view. As George Rathjens suggested well a decade an

"even putting aside the complicating fact of great uncertainty , getting agreement

011 some instmmentality to insure that everyone-or at least a significant number-makes an
appropriate contribution to a group effort to achieve the benefits of a well-rnaintained
6

commons will be more difficult than in the usual case" of commons problem.

)

How right

Rathjens was.
To achieve an effective climate regime it is necessary to address the constraints placed
on collective action outlined by Olson. The Med Plan and the Montreal Protocol suggest that
collective action on climate change is possible

~fthese

constraints can be overcome.

Agreement depends on achieving some consensus regarding the nature and magnitude of
global warming and resulting climatic changes , the best ways to mitigate them and cut
pollution causing them , and how best to pay for doing so. lt has been fairly clear from the
beginning that if one large country or group of states were wi l1 ing to assume much of the
costs of collective action , or if sufficient incentives could be offered to participants , then
intemational cooperation on climate change could take place. Unfortunately, climate change
has so far fit pemiciously into OIS011'S "indetenninate" category, whereby no single
intemational actor has perceived a sufficiently large benefit from the collective good to
justify paying 1110St of the costs of providing it , but in which its contribution to the problem is
so large tbat its failure to participate is central to effective action. 62 The Europeans seem
willing to take 011 this burden ,c, 3 but actualizing that wi l1 ingness is not yet significant from
the perspective of affecting global GHGs 、 and at times it seems tenuous. That 此 ， collective
action on climate change remains problematic-at best
Scientists agree that GHGs are responsible for wam1ing the planet more than would
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occur without such pol1l1tants, and they agree that concentrations of these gases are increasing
at "unprecedentedly rapid rates."

“

There are very few exceptions to this accepted wisdom ,

but where "cI imate skepticism" does exist , mostly in the US , its impact on policy has been
disproportionately great, although this seems to be slowly changing as news repo口s of
changing climate and its impacts become more com l11 on. However, fairly significant
uncertainty and some disagreement remain on the specifìc

inψ acts

of cI imate change. Thus

Thomas Schelling was right to conclude even before the FCCC was negotiated that
"Uncertainties are hllge , and most ofthem will persist.的5 Despite the scientific consensus ,
there is not ‘ even now, a political consensus among the world's govemments on the threat
posed by climate change. Most of them agree with the FCC C' s general notion that we have a
problem that mllst be dealt with, but this still runs Up against the difficulties of ac山 ally
allocating the responsibilities and costs of doing something about it. Political actors have
pushed sufficiently hard to thwart the development of a consensus in the US and a few other
developed countries (e .g. , Australia), as well as in some major developing countries, because
they do not yet see the adverse consequences as being great enough to justi 身

what

they

perceive to be the short-teml costs of taking action. Like in the case of ozone depletion. there
is disagreement, but in this case it is much more important because the costs for some groups
of people, inOuential industries and economic sectors, if not for wbole countries, of meeting
the provisions of an effective climate regime are vastly greater than the costs of the ozone
(,(.

protection regime."{\ Unwillingness to act is dissipating , but much too slowly to prevent what
seems to be.σ/rca吋九 九langerous anthropogenic intcrference in the climate system'的7 (to
panot the FCCC)
The costs of preventing cI imate change are

immediate、 but

the benefits will nol be seen

for many decades. However, the cost-benefit ratio must be viewed as favorable before actors
wiJJ join in strong collective action.(,H This suggests that most govemments will not be
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willing to make the major sacrifices necessarγto effect a halt to (l et alone reverse) global
wanning.(,t) As classical CAT points out , for large groups , if the costs of action are high、
collective action is not likely; the larger the contribution that each member of the group m l1 st
provide to achieve the collective good , the less likelihood there is for collective action.
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This is not rocket science , but it is a basic idea that is sometimes ignored by those who , quite
JUstl 日 ably， vociferously demand aggressive co l\ ective intemational action on climate change

Classical CAT te l\ s us that groups having access to selective incentives will be more
Jikely to act co J1 ectively than will those not having such incentives ,71 thus explaining, at least
in part , the relative successes of the Med Plan and the Montreal Protoco l. lt will be
inordinately difficu \t to achieve more effective intemational cooperation on c1 imate change
without similar provisions for coercion (negative inducements) and side payments (positive
inducements). Selective incentives commonly used in environmental treaty bargaining are
access to funding , resources , markets and technology.72 The developing countries have made
it clear that they want to be "paid" for their participation in a cJ imate regime. The requested
payments include access to expe口 s and technology, training of indigenous scientists and
technicians. and grants to aid development in general and adherence to the regime in
particula r. 73 Effective action to prevent global warming in wi l\ arguably "require resource
transfers . . . greater than all of the foreign aid , m l1It ilateral and bilateral aid in current
programs . ,, 74 Positive inducements include the transfer oftechnology and íinancial aid from
the deveJoped world to the developing world , as was done in the Med Plan and as has been
incorporated into provisions for impJementing the Kyoto Protoco l. But the la t1 er efforts have
been feebJe so fat\failing to provide positive inducements to strong action . Incentives will
have to be strengthened mightily and given vastly more financiaJ backing. Coercion might
come În the form of trade penaJties ‘ similar to those found in the Montreal Protocol
The economÎc resources to provide financial aid (bribes) to deveJoping countries might
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come from a carbon tax imposed on those members of the regime that are producing the most
GHGs per capita. Carbon taxes were proposed in the early 1990s as one of the selective
incentives that might be useful in any c1 imate regime. Such taxes would provide an

incentive 、

albeit negative , for improved efficiency and could provide tinancial resources to assist the
poorer participants in the regime. However , as ScheIIing predicted at the time , it was never
likely that an international carbon tax would be implemented.
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He pointed out that such a

tax would cost the US alone we lI in excess of$125 biIIion ,76 and he "utterly dismiss[ed] the
possibility that the United States would contribute in any such fashion . . . upwards of $1 00
biIIion per year, or that the Senate would

rati 月，

any treaty incurring such financial

conunitments.",77
" For the US, despite it being the world's most profligate global poIIuter, the
notion of an intemational carbon tax is a complete

non-sta口er.

The lack of a tax means there

is no strong negative inducemcnt for the greatest developed-country poIIuters to cut GHG
emissions. What is more , without some kind of global source of money that a universal
carbon tax could

provide 、 the

take the climate regime

international funds that have been created to induce countries to

seriously一-some

financing from the Global Environment Facility,

along with the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed Country Fund and the
Kyoto Protocol Adaptation
111 叮 or

Fund一-arguably

wiII never have enough resources to persuade

developing countries to join coIIective action on climate change. lndeed , the growing

use of funds to help them adapt to climate change may have the perverse effect of giving
them some incentive to avoid limiting GHG poI\ ution
Alternative strategies much less anathema to the US govemme 肘， such as emissions
trading , have so far achieved verγlittlc in the way of GHG emissions reductions
Gove l11 ment-mandated trading of carbon dioxide emissions began in the European Union in
January 20的、 and infonnal trading has been going on for some time in London and Chicago
These efforts hold promise for reducing GHG emissions , but the emissions limits underlying
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them will have to be profoundly increased if there is to be significant movement toward
meeting the FCC C' s objective of stabilizing emissions and preventing even more upset to the
Ea口 h's

climate system than is already guaranteed by past emissions. This profound increase

in GHG emissions limitations is not foreseen at presen t. Successful collective action is
unlikely in the near

futu 間，

especially ifthe US remains willing to enthusiastically participate.

Even coercion is unlikely to be effective in promoting collective action toward a truly
effective climate regime. Early in the climate negotiations , Rathjens suggested that some
economically weaker countries would be susceptible to coercion by economic means ,78 but
this is unlikely to be the case for many other states , such as China or lndia , which must join
in collective action against cJ imate change if such action is to be a long-tenn success
(China's emissions are shooting up as it develops and adopts a US-style transport
infrastructure. lt is expected to overtake the US within two to three decades to become the
largest source of GHG pollution.
partlclpat lO n、 but
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)

Sanctions or coercion would probably also require US

it is unlikely that the US will show much enthusiasm in this regard. Nor are

the Europeans likely to want to take this route because it is not fair to the world's poo r. This
again begs the question of where the positive inducements一-strong ones not evidenced so
far-will come from.
From the start of negotiations on the climate regime 、 the framework Vienna Convention
on ozone protection and the resulting Montreal Protocol were seen as models for col1ective
action. The United Nations and the lntergovenunental Panel on Climate Change therefore
suppo 口 ed

a framework convention and subsequent protocols based on those agreements . The

result was the FCCC and the follow-on Kyoto Protoco l. But infom1ed skeptics ne\'er shared
the view that Montreal was a good mode l. To wit

The MO l1 treal Protocol . . . is

110

harbinger for suppression of CO 2 . Economically,
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what is at stakeis two or three orders of magnitude greater for fossil fuels than for
CFCs , and the prospects for technological replacement of CFCs are m l1 ch brighter.
(The ozone protocol does illustrate the need for worldwide collaboration to make
restrictions worthwhile. . . .) But in one respect it may be revealing. Developing
countries s l1 ccessfully insisted on more than $200 million ofhelp from several
developed-nation contribl1 tors. xo

Even Benedick, a cheerleader for the Montreal Protocol who described it as "the nearest thing
to a dry-run for a

c1 ima峙 -change

convention ," acknowledged that the ozone regime "was

made possible by special circumstances which may not be there with c1 imate change."KI
Indeed , c1 imate change differs from ozone depletion for several reasons.
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CFCs were

produced by a sma11 number of industries and have limited uses. Fossil fuels are produced
everγwhere

and are used by everyone in modemized socìeties. The costs of preventing

climate change are much higher than those for saving the stratospheric ozone , and these costs
are not evenly distribl1 ted. And many important states (e .g. , A l1 stralia, the US , China and
1110st of the oil-exporting states) are sfill not enthusiastic abo l1t undertaking collective action
to prevent c1 imate change. As The E collomisl put it way back in 1990: "Some countries

\λ'ill

prefer to free-ride rather than sign."X3 This remains nearly as true now as it was then. To be
sure , resistance to action is weakening , but the pace of this weakening is glacial , and it has
not been sl1 pplanted by enthusiasm among govemments for major action. The most recent
conference of the FCCC parties in December 2005 had trouble even agreeing on whether to
have falks on future emissions restrictions (althol1 gh US attempts to prevent them were
thwarted in the end) , let alone moving toward implementing significant GHG cuts. lndeed , as
Scott BalTett argues , the Kyoto Protocol is , inevitably, a failed treaty because it does not
overcome the incentives ofstates to free ride ,84

l11 uch
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as classical CAT would anticipate

l11 ight

happen under the circu l11 stances

Haas believed that the process of "interest recalculation" brought on by epistemic
cO l11l11 unities in the Med Plan case would be generally applicable to collective action on other
intemational environmental problems. His assessment indicated that epistemic communities
were important not only to the Med Plan , but also to the Montreal protocol and the European
Community's collective policies for control of acid rain.的 However， he declared 15 years
ago that "the distribution of costs and benefits from possible global c1 imate change is
sllfficiently well estimated so as to inhibit the US government from delegating authority to
ecologically inclined atmospheric scientists . 州的 This succinctly describes the approach of the
Bush administration and its industry allies even today. More generally, scientists have had
1110re difficulty in f1 uencing c1 imate change policy than in the other environmental cases due
to the very high anticipated costs associated with action on climate change and the relatively
high degree of scientific and economic unceltainty. They have promoted action , but witb an
effect tbat has been far too limited. This shows again how CAT is applicable in the case of
climate change , but in a pessimistic sense. That

芯，

CAT applies to c1 imate change (as it did to

the Medite lTanean and ozone agreements) , but in this case collective action will be harder to
achieve. The behavior Olson describes for large groups lacking incentives , or when no 5ingle
member is willing to pay 11105t of the

cost5 、 describes

the circumstances sll lTounding

international efforts to respond to climate change. From this perspective , intemational
co l1 ective action to substa l1 fially address it remains llnlikely
Keohane has argued that , "if there is neither a hegemonic leader nor an international
regime. prospects for cooperation are bleak

indeed、 and

dilcmmas of collective action are

likely to be severe ."S7 ln the case of climate change , it is likely t l1 at a more effective regime
OIld

the

a (benign) hegemonic leader are required. The regime cannot be very successful without

participation一-some

argue

leadership一-of

the US. The US is important because it
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produces a quarter ofthe pollutants causing global wamling
countrγ XR) and it is potentially the

11l 0st

support for collective action. But、

as

(11l 0re

GHGs than any other

effective supplier of incentives useful in gamering

suggested above , robust US participation is not likely for

some years. There is S011l e grassroots action there , and some US states are

11l andating

GHG

emissions limitations , but the pace and scale of action is infinitesimal compared to what is
required to slow global wanning. lndeed , the current US govem 11lent is doing a1l it can to
prevent other countries fro111 working together to limit global warming.
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lt has put off action

to become more energy efficient and less reliant on fossil fuels , making reducing GHG
emissions 1110re costly as time passes-and hence creating greater resistance to action within
the US. The longer the US puts off action , the

11l 0re

it will have to pay to i11l plement a truly

effective c1 imate regi 11l e-and the more intense will be resistance fro111 some economic
sectors to undel1aking the increasingly costly action required. From the beginning, the US has
viewed the costs of a "serious attempt" to cut GHGs as exceeding the potential benefits ,90
notwithstanding the efforts of the Clinton administration to start acting on the country's GHG
emissions. Though c1 imate change is likely to affect the US in hannflll ways (it may be doing
so already, as sllggested by Hurricane Katrina in 2005

(1
)

, most Americans wi I1 be able to

adapt-llnlike 1110st people in the poorest pa口s of the world戶
As Sche l1 ing pllt it we l1 before the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated , "in searching Ollt the
national interests around the globe that l11 ay 1110tivate cOllntries to participate in cooperative
approaches to global wamling , 1 con c\ ude that most of the countries that can afford to do
anything may perceive

veIγlittle

interest of their own , and most ofthe countries that perceive

themselves potentially vulnerable have urgent needs that leave no resources to invest in
greenhouse abate l11 en t.,, 93 This attitllde is shifting in Europe; witness genuine e fTorts there to
imple l11 ent some GHG emissions cuts and el11 issions trading.94 Bllt words surpass deeds ,
even as Europe and the US move further apart on this issue. A.nd there should be 110
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expectation of more than token contributions to the climate regime from the developing
world. Indeed , they sti l1 very much view action on c1 imate change as a question of justice.
They point out that the wealthy countries ofthe world have caused most ofthe problem , and
that those countries ought to act robustly before even asking the poor ones to begin limiting
their own emissions of GHGs.
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Schelling outlined ten reasons why the problem of climate change would be (and
remains) "daunting，， :9的 (1) it is a global problem that no single country can solve , even if that
single country were willing to do so; (2) the magnitude ofpotential abatement costs are
perceived as being "immense"; (3) there is a disparity between the equitable distribution of
costs and the optimal distribution of abatement; (4) the climate regime must be flexible yet
able to survive at least 50 years (an understatement); (5) a l1 countries consume fossil fuels ,
thus all must participate in the regime (an overstatement given that some contribute very little
to the problem); (6) the distribution of energy sources and use differs drastically among
countries; (7) states have varying abilities to pay for carbon emissions abatement and to
adjust practices to achieve that abatement; (8) the rate at which population
increases

di 叮ers

and 扣 eluse

among states , and their rates of economic expansion vary; (9) nuclear

power-the main alternative source of electricity-is expensive and unpopular in many
countries (but this seems to be changing incrementally as the urgency of acting to address
climate change grows and the nuclear-power industry steps up lobbying); (1 0) significant
unce11amtles

remam一-and

will persist for some time. He adds , "Another hurdle is the

difficulty of defining and determining concepts of liability, responsibility , and illegality for
ensuring adequate compensation for the measurable ham1ful impacts of global wam1ing .,,97
Daunting indeed!
Despi te the successes of the Med Plan and the Montreal Protocol , all of these potential
obstacles suggest that the climate cbange problem wiU continue to be a much more difficult
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collective action problem , similar to the scenarios of unsuccessful collective action
envisioned by Olson's theory. C AT tells us that unless the disadvantages of large groups are
overcome , "valuable institutions that would benefit a set of individuals wi l1 not necessarily be
created. ,, 9R As George Rathjens points out pessimistically,

because ofthe UnCe11ainty , the very long lag-times involved , and the fact that
effective mitigative action is likely to require something approaching a global
consensus , the prospects for near-tenn action directed at reducing global warl12 ;ng
must be seen to be poor. These factors . . . tend to

l11 ake

mitigation less a likely

response to the "threat" than a delay and eventual adaptation. Public policy would
be we l1 advised to face this reality.9 l)

This is precisely what has happened: Increasingly, intemational diplo l11 acy regarding climate
change 、 and

practical responses to it , are about adaptalion , not about limiting global

wanning. 'OO Considering the circumstances surrounding the cli l11 ate change problem , as Oran
Young told us in the

1980丸 "it

is no cause for surprise that the foundations for an

intemational regime designed to protect the ozone layer are now in place , whereas a regime
to deal with global cli l11 ate change is not yet in sigh t. ,,1 01 V月1e now have a regime , comprising
the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol , but we do not yet have an effective one
Such pessimism does not exclude the possibility that some significant reductions in
GHGs wiU be possible , but it sllggests that such redllctions will often be a result of actions
undertaken because they are justjfiable on cost-benefit grounds in their own right (e.g. ,
reduced emissions due to energy conservation prompted by a desire to improve local air
qllality , to use less petroleum as its price increases or to improve energy security). To be sure ,
the only effective method we have to limit c1 imate change is to reduce GHG emissions
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associated with energy use. Given increasing desire to improve energy efficiency and to
il11 prove the local environ l11 ent, the prospects of favorable changes are Velγgood. lndeed , the
Europeans are taking substantial action in this regard. Alas , that action is vely far short of
what is required to address limit global wanning and avert dangerous climatic change

Conclusion
The c1 imate regime has not been a lotal failure一-an optimist would say that it is a work in
progress that may one day have a significant positive impact on cli l11 ate change-but it would
be disingenuous to say it has been even slightly successful so far. Govemments have come
nowhere near meeting the goal set in 1992 with the signing ofthe FCCC of returning GHG
their emissions to 1990 levels (by 2000) and stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in
the at l11 0sphere, let alone achieving the culs in emissions of GHGs called for in the Kyoto
Protocol, which themselves are grossly inadequate compared to what scientists sa)' is
necessary. There is no prospect whatever of this substantially changing before the end of the
Kyoto commitment period (2008-2012) . lt seems likely that the collective action

necessarγto

protect the Earth from climate change is not very likely in the medium tenn, eithe r. More
agree l11 ents and promises by govemments to act are likely, and increasing action at local
levels

l11 ay

be about to take o fT, but those countries that enact major new conunitments will

be few (if any). As Schelling put it a decade and a half ago , "Prospects for serious abate l11 ent
[of GHG emissions] in the near future are not goOd.' ,1 02 Prospects have not changed since
We can expect some action so that the proble l11 will not be as bad as it would be if nothing
were done , but we should 110t expect to see a post-Kyoto intemational agreement
acco l11 panied by major collective actio l1 toward stopping, least of all reversing , global
wan 11l ng
Despite all the new theory that has been developed since OISO I1 'S treatise on collective
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action , his classical theory remains extremely useful in explaining the failure so far of the

c1 imate regime , and it may be equally useful in predicting future cooperation. Olson's CAT
suggests that an ~，加 ctive climate regime is an unlikely prospect, at least until the impacts of
climate change become much more pronounced. As Young argued quite some time ago (but
it is as tme today as it was when he said it) , "Talk of a creeping crisis with regard to global
warming simply cannot produce the impact of the exogenous shocks . . . as a force in
breaking the logjams that conul1 only arise in institutional bargaining. This is no doubt
frustrating to those working on a number of important collective-action problems ," including
climate change. l()J Until then , adaptation may be the preferred strategy ofmany states.
OISO I1 said that selective incentives separate from the good being sought must be
provided to bring about collective action . This elegantly and simply explains Russia's
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in late 2004: Despite ongoing domestic debates about
whether ratification would benefit Russia or hurt 泣， Europe's wi l1 ingness to trade support for
Russian accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) for ratification ofthe protocol
provided the necessary incentive. The added incen tÏ ves of the prestige , respect and status
WTO membership could bring , as well as moving Russia closer to the European market ,
could only help induce its accession to the agreemen t. lt also did not hurt that Russia really
does not need to do much at all to meet its Kyoto

commitmen俗 ，

handsomely fro111 emissions trading. But incentives

necessa可 to

and likely will profit
bring other countries on

board are tew. Relative to the need for emissions cuts , as well as the scale ofresistance to
action in countnes 1110St important to the regime but which are resistant to limiting , let alone
cutt lJl g ‘ their emissions (i .e ., the US and large developing countries such as China, lndia and
Brazil) , the disincentives to joining , namely the costs to extant economic interests and
I11 S tJ tutlOl芯 ，

is perceived to be much greater than any incentive to cut GHG emissions

drastically. ln the cases of the large developing

economies、 much
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larger "side payments ,"

alongside creative disincentives (e.g. , trade restrictions like those used in the context of the
Montreal Protocol) are required to entice them to limit future emissions. The Clean
Development Mechanism and climate fund designed to help implement the Kyoto Protocol
are puny relative to the enticements of aggressive , energy-intensive economic growth
The Montreal Protocol and Med Plan successes relative to the climate regime fit the
logic of CAT. ln each case , a large latent group of states was mobilized to undertake
collective action to achieve a common good. Both have made real progress toward their
objectives. It was those states with the greatest economic and diplomatic resources that
worked most vigorously toward collective ac tÎ on. In the case of the Mediterranean , France
played this important role: "Because of its dominant position , France was able to take , and
did take , a leadership role in the ear1 y phase of the Med Plan. . . . During the early years of
the program the greatest national contributions came from France; without this

suppo口 the

program would not have gotten offthe ground."I04 In the case ofthe Montreal Protocol , the

US took 011 the leadership role , pushing other states to act on its proposals to limit ODCs
(albeit to benefit US producers ofCFC altematives). However, far from leading , in the case
of climate change the US has lately tried to veto more aggressive action , and Europe's
leader叫1ip

has lacked vitality. Things would be worse without European efforts to lead on the

issue , but collective action necessa可 to genuinely address cli111ate change needs 111uch more
leadership than any states have displayed so fa r. If Europe wants to continue leading , and to
see genuine results fro111 the leadership , it will have to work much harde r. lt 111USt 1110ve
forthrightly to adopt even more aggressive policies that set a powerful example for the wor1 d ,
110t least the US , despite the costs , while also encouraging through its trade and economic
policies c\ imate-friendly productio l1 beyond its borders
If more robust European leadership is forthc0111ing , it is possible that other states , along
with their peoples , wi I1 increasingly define their nationaI interests一-Haas's "redetennination
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of national interests" 105一in tenns of protecting the cO l11l11 on atmospheric good and not being
part of (or being seen as being part o f) the unfair and hann 臼 1 despoiling of that good.
Scientific asseSS l11 ents suggesting that global wamling could lead, paradoxically, to drastic
te 1ll perature falls in Europe may be sti 1llulus for 1ll ore European concem and action. The
question is whether such a "reconstruction" of national interests , arguably underway in
among European Union members , will bear fruit in time. ln this regard one must tend toward
pessimism. We should expect things to get much worse , not only because the scientists tell us
change is inevitable no matter wbat is done now, but because the a l11 0unt of action required to
put a

111叮 or

106

dent in the problem-on the order ofat least 60-70 percent cuts in GHGs , v"-are

simply not going to happen anytime soon-if even in our lifetimes. The cost of adapfafion
is-rigbtly or wrongly, correctly or not-viewed by the US and some otber rich states, and
many not-so-rich ones ，的 being lower than robust action to cut GHG pollutants
Besides much stronger leadership, what would increase the likelihood of effective
intemational collective action on climate change? CAT suggests a number ofvariables that
need to cbange. Knowledge and infomlation are essential in this case. Scientists should of
course continue trying to improve our understanding of global wamling and resulting climate
change 、 and

they should continue to actively cooperate to persuade govemments ofthe

importance of acting on their findings as well as working with nongovenunental
organizations and the

l11 edia

should not be neutral

(a 缸er

to educate publics and policymakers. But knowledge brokers

all , those who oppose action have not been neutral); they should

consciously and systematically endeavor to show govemments that national interests are
hanned by inaction. lt needs to be demonstrated that govemments are shirking their most
basic duty of defending tbe national interest by not acting aggressively to combat this
probl em. lmproved science and 1110re news coverage are starting to have an effect, as noted
earlie r. ln the US , for example, localmunicipalities and some state govemments are
30

implementing laws and regulations to limit GHG emissions , having recognized that the
federal govemment is 110t doing enough.
Furthe l1110re , the 110tion of costs can be reinterpreted: the cost of inaction exceeds the
cost of action . This of course requires careful consideratio l1 of those economic sectors 1110St
affected by the necessary transitio l1 away from fossil-fuel intensive economies. This will be
telTibly difficult , but there is still too little focus by govemments and the media 011 the
economic advantages of transitioning to the genuine move "beyond petroleum" (to borrow
one oil company's slogan). Alongside this is the equally difficult effort to create new
incentives for action by the developing world , starting with the world's wealthy countries
reducing their GHG emissions and providing much more financial assistance to developing
countries. Withol1 t this action by the developed countries to fulfill their common but
differentiated responsibilities associated with climate change , the developing world will
continue to fo l1 ow their bad example.
Doing these things is obviously tremendously difficult; otherwise we would have seen
more movement already. Looking on the bright side , intemational collective action to address
environmental problems has been proved doable by the evolution of a number of
intemational regimes , such as those manifested in the Montreal Protocol and the Med Plan.
Classical CAT shows us which criteria should be met before similar success can be achieved
in the case of climate change . Unfortunately, the comparatively favorable circu111stances that
obtained in the ozone and MeditelTa nean cases一-themselves difficult enough一-are absent in
the case of climate change. The failure of the climate regime so far is "Iogical" from the
perspective of classical CAT.

Thus 、 we

would be wcll advised to prepare ourselves to

weather the effects of climate change and to adapt to a future that is significantly different
than tbe one we have come to know. Sadly and shamefully-but not surprisingly一-c limate
change is with us to stay.
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